Introduction
Parental responsibility to a third, outside the family individual, in any situation, potentially undermines the completeness of the nuclear family unit. It is a signal of anomaly.
(Dr Claire Sturge quoted by Black J in Re D, para. 61) This case comment seeks to examine the family form rhetoric in the High Court case of Re D (contact and parental responsibility: Lesbian mothers and known father) [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam), [2006] 1 FCR 556. Specifically, the comment seeks to relate the concept of the two-parent 'sexual family' (Fineman, 1995, pp.143-176) , as the means of legitimising and organising familial relations, to the decision in Re D. In Re D, the High Court granted a restricted form of parental responsibility to the applicant and child's biological father, Mr B. The respondents, Ms A and Ms C-a lesbian couple who are D's co-mothers and primary carers-objected to the application. By awarding Mr B a contingent form of parental responsibility, Judge Black felt that he was taking a 'creative' approach to parental responsibility that would accommodate Mr B's need to be recognised as D's father, as well as reflecting the 'paramount position of the family comprising the two mothers and the [child] ' (para. 93) . Re D is a notable case for several reasons. Firstly, it directly situates parental responsibility in the context of parental status and recognition, as opposed to its more traditional presentation as a practical tool for parenting. The 'creative' use of parental responsibility in Re D further reflects the current inadequacy of legal terminology in a society where parenthood increasingly occurs outside the confines of the traditional nuclear family. This has contributed to the growing significance of obtaining an award of parental responsibility in the absence of any alternative recognition or grant of status that may better suit a particular parenting role. Secondly, while arguably affording further and welcomed legal recognition to same-sex parenting and families, the judgment in Re D emphasises the limited form of this increased recognition and its dependence on a sexually intimate couple as opposed to care and/or dependency relations. Thirdly, in positioning Mr B as a potential threat to the security of the primary family unit, we see a shift in legal attitude towards fatherhood, which has traditionally been constructed as fomenting family security. This shift however is perhaps of limited applicability, materialising only when the child is already located within a sexual family unit. In Re D, we also see a legal deference to the significance and recognition of genetic fatherhood, begging the question, to what extent have dominant notions of fatherhood really changed?
Background and Legal Issue
The history of Re D is that Ms A and Ms C decided they would like to raise a child together. Wanting the child to have a father figure, they advertised for a man who would be interested in (physically) fathering a child with them. Mr B came forward and in 2000, D was born after sexual intercourse took place between Ms A and Mr B.
It is unclear from the case how the parties reached their decision to pursue the arrangement, or to what extent they explicitly discussed how parental status and roles would be manifest. However, no formal agreement was made and when D was born conflict soon arose when it became clear that there was disparity in relation to the 
Considering Parental Responsibility

Obtaining Parental Responsibility
It is worth here considering how particular adults obtain parental responsibility, to help stress the significance of the concept of the sexual family in the legal regulation of families. While the legislative framework is somewhat flexible (see sections 2(5)-(7) and 3(5), Children Act 1989)-and certainly more so than that of parentage-it still reflects an ideological preference for the (biological and/or legal) sexual family by making it more straightforward for those who are within its boundaries to obtain parental responsibility. To demonstrate, women who give birth are automatically granted parental responsibility (section (2)(1) and 2(2)(a), Children Act 1989), as are married fathers (section 2(1), Children Act 1989). As D's full biological mother, this is how Ms A obtained parental responsibility. Biological fathers, who like Mr B were not married to the child's legal mother at the time of birth, can directly apply for parental responsibility and have been able to do so since the Children Act 1989 came into force. They can either make a formal agreement with the child's mother (section 4(1)(b), Children Act 1989), or apply for a parental responsibility order or a residence order from the court (sections 4(1)(c) and 12(1), Children Act 1989). While much attention has been given to the difference between how married and unmarried fathers obtain parental responsibility (see Sheldon 2001) , it is important to recognise that only were to become Ms A's civil partner, and apply directly for parental responsibility, her award would remain in force until otherwise directed by the court, as with the parental responsibility orders awarded to unmarried biological fathers. In other words, for a parental responsibility award not to be contingent on another award under the children Act 1989 being in place, the adult must be within the boundary of the sexual family unit, either through a biological connection, or by formalising their intimate relationship with a child's 'natural' parent.
The Concept of Parental Responsibility
Before we discuss the desirability of Mr B being granted the order, it is worth first considering the actual concept and purpose of having parental responsibility. Parental responsibility was introduced into statute by the Children Act 1989. Its introduction was intended to signal a shift in emphasis from parental power and rights, to parental care (see Lowe and Douglas, 2007, pp. 369-70) . The relationship between parental rights and responsibilities has been addressed in detail by various commentators since the Children Act 1989 came into force (see McCall Smith, 1990; Eekelaar, 1991 Eekelaar, , 1994 Bainham, 1994) . What is important for the purposes of this comment is to appreciate that the introduction of parental responsibility was intended to foster the notion that, …the duty to care for the child and to raise him to moral, physical and emotional health is the fundamental task of parenthood and the only justification for the authority that it confers.
(Department of Health, Introduction to the Children Act 1989, HMSO: 1989: para.1.4) It would seem to follow then that the function of parental responsibility is to enable someone to act as a parent by legally conferring to them the ability to make decisions about a child's care and upbringing. In other words, vest someone with the legal authority to act as a social parent. However, as the very definition of parental responsibility suggests, parental rights and responsibilities remain intertwined terms (see further Bainham, 1999, pp.33-35; Lowe and Douglas, 2007, 377-408) :
… 'parental responsibility' means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibility and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.
(Section 3(1) of the Children Act 1989)
Practically, we can easily see how rights and responsibilities may be acted on simultaneously, particularly in the context of a parent(s) seeking to exercise their care of the child without the interference from the state or another parent(s). However, as Bainham, 1999, 33-35) , most of these were not in dispute. Although there is not space in this short comment to discuss the psychiatrist's report in full, it is worth noting that in the absence of any conclusive research as to whether The more her father is in evidence, the less clear D will be about what constitutes her family and how viable the unit within which she lives is.
The more her father is around, the more likely that others will treat the "central" family as incomplete and seek to include the father e.g. in school decisions and medical treatment.
A third parent (and I use the word advisedly) will be confusing for D. Her sense of security will be strongest if she is clear that responsibility for her lies within her "nuclear" family. the fine-balance of the award being, or not being in D's best interests, we also have to wonder why Black J thought it better to award an order 'stripped of practical effect' as opposed to deciding that a non-contingent award should be granted, or that the application should be denied?
Concluding Discussion
Considering Alternative Decisions 
Dismissing the Application and Legal Terminology
There are few cases whereby a parental responsibility order has been refused, indicative of the reality that few men without some sort of 'positive relationship' with their child apply for one (Sheldon, 2001, p.103) . Although Mr B has been referred to occasionally as a '(known) sperm donor' (para. 53), this hardly adequately reflects the situation now. Under current precedents then-as referred to by the CAFCASS officer-we can appreciate why Black J did not simply dismiss the application when Speculatively, it would appear that the granting of rights to Mr B might thus be seen as a way of imposing appropriate and responsible (male) control over her, the need for such control being further mandated by her mental and emotional fragility. (Sheldon, 2005, p.357) Interestingly, Hedge J was not convinced of the permanency of Ms D's relationship with her new partner, Mr S. In other words, he was viewing Ms D and her child as being a single-parent family unit, as opposed to a sexual family unit. Therefore, in drawing attention to this possible shift in legal rhetoric on fatherhood, we must not loose sight of the fact that it may well be of a very limited nature, materialising only when the child is already located within a stable sexual family.
Secondly, the shift may also be limited in that it is coloured by a growing emphasis on biological ( 
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